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Human deep sleep is characterized by reduced sensory activity, responsiveness to stim-
uli, and conscious awareness. Given its ubiquity and reversible nature, it represents an
attractive paradigm to study the neural changes which accompany the loss of conscious-
ness in humans. In particular, the deepest stages of sleep can serve as an empirical test
for the predictions of theoretical models relating the phenomenology of consciousness
with underlying neural activity. A relatively recent shift of attention from the analysis of
evoked responses toward spontaneous (or “resting state”) activity has taken place in the
neuroimaging community, together with the development of tools suitable to study dis-
tributed functional interactions. In this review we focus on recent functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies of spontaneous activity during sleep and their relation-
ship with theoretical models for human consciousness generation, considering the global
workspace theory, the information integration theory, and the dynamical core hypothesis.
We discuss the venues of research opened by these results, emphasizing the need to
extend the analytic methodology in order to obtain a dynamical picture of how functional
interactions change over time and how their evolution is modulated during different con-
scious states. Finally, we discuss the need to experimentally establish absent or reduced
conscious content, even when studying the deepest sleep stages.
Keywords: consciousness, sleep, fMRI, EEG, resting state
1. INTRODUCTION
Non-Rapid Eye Movement (NREM) sleep in humans is commonly
defined as a state characterized by suspended sensory activity,
unresponsiveness to stimuli, a relative muscular inactivity, and
loss of conscious awareness (AASM, 2007; Tononi, 2009). A well
equipped researcher could unequivocally establish the first three
features, since they represent objective qualities whose presence
can be assessed by suitable measurements. The fourth feature, in
contrast, is of a more puzzling nature. The presence or absence
of conscious awareness appears difficult to establish from a third
person perspective, given its subjective and private nature. Fur-
thermore, the loss of consciousness is dissociated from the first
three features, as philosophers have speculated by introducing the
concept of “zombie agents” (Chalmers, 1996) and as happens, for
instance, during complex partial seizures (Blumenfeld and Taylor,
2003). The particular nature of this loss of conscious awareness has
even led to question the suitability of traditional scientific method-
ology to explain this phenomenon (McGinn, 1989), which consists
of a quintessentially subjective experience.
It is certainly unknown whether neuroscience and the study
of the brain will ever solve the so-called “hard problem,” i.e., to
explain the subjective characteristics acquired by conscious per-
cepts or, in other words, why do we feel things and why they feel
the way they do (Chalmers, 1995). However, it is likely that the
neural mechanisms underlying consciousness can be discovered,
even if in the end they do not tell us anything about the subjective
side of perception. In this picture, consciousness is a product of
certain neural processes which must account for its phenomenol-
ogy (knowledge about the conscious state which is obtained by
experimentation or introspection). Examples of this knowledge
include the serial nature of conscious operations, the possibility of
subliminal perception, the attentional blink, the unified nature of
each conscious scene, and many others (for a more comprehensive
discussion, see Edelman, 2003; Seth et al., 2006).
While a discovery science of consciousness is possible, inves-
tigations are greatly aided by theoretical models of how brain
neurophysiology can give rise to these phenomenological fea-
tures (Seth, 2007). Such a model needs to postulate a causal link
between neural observables (such as firing rate or synchrony, spik-
ing frequency, activity in different cortical structures, etc.) and
these features. As a simple (and ultimately wrong) example, it
could be postulated that loss of consciousness during sleep is
caused by a suspension of neural activity, i.e., firing rates drop,
impairing the cortical information processing which gives rise to
conscious content. This model appears plausible, since cortical
activity is linked (for example, by lesion studies) to the contents
of consciousness and firing rate modulation is considered a fun-
damental mechanism of neural information processing (Gerstner
et al., 1997). We know that neural firing rates can be maintained
or even increased during sleep (Tononi and Massimini, 2008) and
therefore this model is not correct, but it should nevertheless
illustrate the procedure according to which such models can be
formulated.
Here we will review more successful models of consciousness,
including the global workspace model, the information integra-
tion theory, and the dynamical core hypothesis. These choices are
motivated by the relatively large number of neuroimaging studies
which address their predictions. More comprehensive reviews can
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be found elsewhere (Seth, 2007; Boly and Seth, 2012), here we wish
to focus on those models best suited to be approached by the study
of spontaneous (or “resting state”) activity recorded with func-
tional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). At first glance, this
choice appears rather arbitrary and driven by the experimental
methodology. However, a common characteristic of these mod-
els is their treatment of consciousness as a global, dynamic process
(instead of as a localized phenomenon). This is consistent with the
experimental observation that consciousness can survive localized
cortical damage and will fade only if sub-cortical arousal systems
are compromised (Tononi and Edelman, 1998). Since fMRI is cur-
rently the only neuroimaging technique allowing to non-invasively
record whole-brain activity with spatial resolution of millimeters
at a reasonable temporal resolution (≈1 s), it provides a promis-
ing experimental set-up to address predictions about global brain
function and dynamics.
A natural starting point to test a theoretical model linking
neural activity to conscious phenomenology is to contrast con-
scious vs. unconscious brain states. From an experimental view-
point, NREM sleep is attractive since it is recurrent, evolves deter-
ministically through a series of sleep stages until a state of deep
unconsciousness is reached and is reversible (every subject can be
studied both in a conscious and unconscious state). Disorders of
consciousness such as a coma or the vegetative state usually involve
brain trauma or injuries, on the other hand, sleep is a physiologi-
cal state occurring in the healthy brain. Motivated by this, we will
focus on human sleep and how sleep neuroimaging experiments
can be used to test the predictions of the aforementioned theories.
After reviewing the main published results, we will discuss future
venues of research, such as the need to fully incorporate a temporal
dimension and to track the dynamical changes of brain connectiv-
ity over time. Finally, we will discuss to what extent deep NREM
sleep can be regarded as a truly unconscious state and what possi-
ble measures can be taken to control for this in the experimental
paradigm.
2. THE GLOBAL WORKSPACE THEORY AND
FRONTOPARIETAL CONNECTIVITY
The global workspace theory (introduced by Baars, 1988) pos-
tulates that consciousness serves an integrative role. Conscious
content is characterized by its global availability and can be
accessed by different cognitive processes, i.e., it is broadcasted to
an “audience” of distributed, parallel networks which can process
information unconsciously. The integration of information into
a global resource naturally accounts for the serial nature of con-
scious experience. A neural instantiation of the global workspace
theory has been proposed by Dehaene et al. (2003), in which stim-
ulation leads to the generation of a coherent and global activity
pattern inhibiting the processing of concurrent stimuli. As stimuli
salience is increased, a sudden (i.e., non-linear) transition from a
local to a global activity pattern takes place.
A direct prediction of the global workspace theory is that
unconscious stimuli will activate cortical areas restricted to low
level sensory processing, whereas the passage to consciousness
will involve activity in a constellation of regions transcending the
sensory cortices. Experimental results assign to a frontoparietal
network of regions a key role in this global pattern of activity.
This fact is supported by experiments contrasting conscious vs.
unconscious perception (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2001) and by the
increased metabolism of these regions during resting state wake-
fulness (Mazoyer et al., 2001; Raichle, 2006). Furthermore, resting
state activity Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) activity fluc-
tuations are coherent in a frontoparietal network of regions which
has been termed the Default Mode Network (DMN), since activ-
ity in these areas decreases during attention demanding tasks and
has a positive association with introspection and self-awareness
(Raichle et al., 2001).
Auditory stimulation during deep sleep results in a local activa-
tion of auditory cortices (Portas et al., 2000), which is concordant
with the predictions of the global workspace theory. It must be
noted, however, that studies of auditory stimulation during sleep
assume a BOLD response linearly correlated with the model.
Recent results show a global brain response in event-related par-
adigms, with activity changes departing from a simple covariance
with the time series of expected BOLD activation (Gonzalez-
Castillo et al., 2012). This point should be taken into consider-
ation for future studies studying the neural responses elicited by
stimulation during unconscious states, such as sleep.
During sleep,not only auditory stimulation fails to elicit activity
in the frontoparietal network, but in addition decreased metab-
olism is observed in these regions (Nofzinger et al., 2002, see
Figure 1A for an illustration). Recent EEG-fMRI studies have
extensively studied resting state functional connectivity of BOLD
signals inside the frontoparietal DMN, finding decreased connec-
tivity between the frontal and posterior components (Horovitz
et al., 2009; Sämann et al., 2011) (Figure 1C). Changes in connec-
tivity in other brain systems (such as sensory cortices) were not
found during light sleep (Larson-Prior et al., 2009) and have not
been intensively evaluated for deeper sleep stages (with the excep-
tion of a control network anticorrelated with the DMN, studied
in Sämann et al., 2011). Thus, it has not been firmly established
whether sleep correlates with a global connectivity breakdown or
only with a frontoparietal disconnection. However, the study of
electrophysiological events (EEG microstates) correlated with dif-
ferent networks measured with fMRI (Britz et al., 2010) shows
invariant results (in terms of preserved topographic maps) across
NREM sleep (Brodbeck et al., 2012).
Further evidence of the link between DMN activity and con-
scious wakefulness can be obtained by studying the BOLD cor-
relates of K-complexes, large amplitude EEG events which are
hypothesized to serve a dual function: protection against envi-
ronmental stimuli (Bastien et al., 2000; Cash et al., 2009) and brief
arousals to monitor the surroundings (Ehrhart et al., 1981; Halasz,
1993). Combined EEG-fMRI studies show that the BOLD corre-
lates of K-complexes comprise multimodal sensory areas as well as
key regions in the DMN (e.g., the precuneus) (Caporro et al., 2012;
Jahnke et al., 2012) (the resulting activation patterns are shown in
Figure 1B), which is consistent with the latter proposed function
(brief periods of a “wakefulness-like” brain state).
An interesting observation is that deep sleep disrupts the coher-
ence of spontaneous BOLD fluctuations inside the DMN, but does
not completely eliminate the network. For instance, a model free
approach to identify coherent activity fluctuations (Independent
Component Analysis – ICA; Beckmann et al., 2005) identifies the
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FIGURE 1 | Frontoparietal metabolism and connectivity during NREM
sleep. (A) Regions of decreased glucose metabolism during NREM sleep
compared to wakefulness adapted from Nofzinger et al. (2002). Figure
reproduced with permission from Oxford University Press. (B) Regions
showing a positive BOLD response to K-complexes during the N2 stage of
NREM sleep adapted from Jahnke et al. (2012) thresholded at F >18.7,
p<0.05, FWE corrected. Figure reproduced with permission from Elsevier.
(C) Seed correlation maps based on PCC during wakefulness and deep sleep
(z > 5) and for their difference (z >3.5) adapted from Horovitz et al. (2009). (D)
The Default Mode Network (DMN) obtained with Independent Component
Analysis (ICA) for wakefulness, N1, N2, and N3 sleep (the fMRI data used
was previously reported in Tagliazucchi et al., 2013).
DMN both during wakefulness and deep sleep. The resulting DMN
ICA components (obtained using the data reported in Tagliazuc-
chi et al., 2013) are shown in Figure 1D (but see also Boly et al.,
2012). If the emergence of this network is related to a conscious
state, how can it be generally preserved during sleep? An answer
to this question can be found in the non-trivial large-scale thal-
amocortical connectivity which correlates with BOLD functional
connectivity (Honey et al., 2007; Greicius et al., 2009; Hermund-
stad et al., 2013). Homeostatic processes could result in preserved
connectivity even during deep sleep-setting up a baseline state
of the brain including a functional repertoire resembling differ-
ent task-related states and thus facilitating a quick response to
environmental demands (Raichle, 2010). If this indeed occurs
during unconscious states such as sleep, it follows that measures
of functional connectivity must be “normalized” by the strength
of the underlying anatomical connections in order to properly
understand changes in frontoparietal connectivity.
3. INFORMATION INTEGRATION
Two remarkable phenomenological characteristics of every con-
scious scene are its highly integrated, indivisible nature, and
its high information content. These two observations have
been developed by Tononi (2004, 2008) into a mathematically
grounded theory of consciousness. As will be briefly explained
below, the combination of these two features requires infor-
mation integration, which means that the system as a whole
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generates more information than what would be expected from
the independent contribution of all its parts.
Information here is understood in terms of uncertainty reduc-
tion, i.e., it quantifies how much knowledge about the system is
gained when a particular state (out of many possible states) is
specified. For instance, knowing the state of a unit with two pos-
sible states (such as a photodiode, a recurrent example) will yield
only one bit of information. The repertoire of conscious states is
immensely larger and therefore each of its states entails a much
higher informational content. Such a high informational content
could also be achieved, in principle, by assembling a large number
of binary units together, which would exponentially increase the
number of possible states of the system. However, this informa-
tion is not integrated, since the units do not interact and therefore
the informational content of the system as a whole does not go
beyond the sum of each independent contribution. Furthermore,
there is no casual dependence between the units of such system,
since changes induced in any subset of units will not affect the
remaining ones.
This model argues that conscious awareness is a function of a
system’s capacity for information integration. From a theoretical
point of view, this is attractive since the information integration
capacity of any physical system can be quantified in a single numer-
ical quantity, termed8 (Tononi and Sporns, 2003). Furthermore,
the system subsets in which information is integrated-termed
complexes can be algorithmically identified. To measure 8, a sys-
tem is first divided into two non-overlapping subsets A and B.
Then, the states of one partition are replaced by random noise
(i.e., the maximum entropy distribution). The effective informa-
tion is then obtained as the relative entropy of B with and without
the noise injection. This procedure is repeated inverting the order
of the subsets and the effective informations are added. Finally, the
weakest informational link is identified as the Minimum Informa-
tion Partition (MIP), this is, the division of the system yielding
the minimum amount of effective information. This value, prop-
erly normalized, is 8. The information integrating subsets, i.e.,
the complexes, are identified as those sets which have no sub- or
super-sets with higher8 value (or equivalently, none of their sub-
sets integrates more information than them and they are not part
of a larger set integrating more information than them).
Following the predictions of this model, states of diminished
conscious awareness – such as deep NREM sleep should be char-
acterized by impaired information integration, i.e., a lower 8.
Simulations suggest that information integration is decreased
for systems whose units behave in a synchronous way, since the
repertoire of possible states is reduced (Balduzzi and Tononi,
2008). During deep human NREM sleep cortical dynamics become
bistable, with periods of firing (depolarized up-state) alternating
with periods of quiescence (hyperpolarized down-state). These
dynamics are manifest in the EEG as large amplitude waves whose
frequency (in the<4 Hz range) is much lower than that of rhythms
observed during wakefulness (interestingly, BOLD activity fluctu-
ations also increase in amplitude during sleep Horovitz et al., 2008,
but it is unknown whether these two effects are related). Computer
simulations also suggest that high values of information inte-
gration require network architectures displaying both functional
specialization (i.e., segregated functional processes) and functional
integration between them (Tononi and Sporns, 2003).
By means of EEG-fMRI recordings during wakefulness and
sleep, we recently tested these two predictions (Tagliazucchi et al.,
2013). More specifically, we hypothesized that deep sleep would:
(1) result in an alteration of the integration-segregation balance of
brain activity and (2) that this alteration would correlate with the
power of slow cortical rhythms (concurrently recorded with scalp
EEG). We represented whole-brain interactions as a functional
network, in which each node corresponds to a cortical or sub-
cortical area and connections between them indicate synchronous
activity of their BOLD signals (Sporns et al., 2004; Bullmore and
Sporns, 2009). The degree of functional integration/segregation in
this structure can be quantified by the modularity (Q), which takes
values between 0 and 1 and indicates how well the network can
be separated into densely connected subsets (modules) sparsely
connected between them (Sporns, 2013). As shown in Figure 2A,
functional network modularity was found to increase during the
deeper sleep stages (N2 and N3 sleep, following the AASM sleep
staging criteria), which are characterized by impaired or absent
consciousness. On the other hand, modularity was not found to
increase during early (N1) sleep. Furthermore, modularity was
found to correlate with the power of slow EEG rhythms, both
during arousals from deep sleep to wakefulness (Figure 2B) and
spontaneously (Figure 2C). These results are along the lines of
the predicted integration/segregation disruption taking place in
deep NREM sleep. However, the network modularity of a system
is not necessarily equivalent to its 8, which measures effective
information and causal interactions. Since changes in correlation
do not imply changes in causality (and vice-versa), it follows that
any approach which is based on functional network properties
can only yield an indirect confirmation of these predictions. A
perturbational approach based on non-invasive magnetic stimu-
lation shows that effective connectivity (measured using EEG) is
impaired during NREM sleep (Massimini et al., 2005),but a similar
approach has not been attempted so far during fMRI recordings.
On the other hand, there are computational similarities between
modularity and measures of neural complexity (Tononi et al.,
1994), also introduced as potential correlates of the level of con-
scious awareness (see section on the dynamical core hypothesis).
The finding of increased functional modularity during NREM
sleep has been independently reported by other research groups
(Boly et al., 2012; Spoormaker et al., 2012). Also, other network
attributes associated with integration and segregation are altered
during human NREM sleep (Spoormaker et al., 2010; Uehara et al.,
2013), in fact allowing sleep classification solely based on fMRI
functional connectivity information (Tagliazucchi et al., 2012c).
8 is a global property of the thalamocortical system, and since
fMRI can simultaneously record activity in the whole-brain with
relatively good (when compared to other non-invasive methods)
spatial resolution, it appears that the theoretical machinery pro-
posed by Tononi and others could be directly applied on fMRI
data to precisely quantify the thalamocortical 8, as well as the
complexes in which information is integrated. However, there are
practical and theoretical obstacles to this program. First, the com-
putation of 8 requires the identification of the MIP, which can
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FIGURE 2 | fMRI functional connectivity networks show a more
segregated structure during deep NREM sleep. (A) Functional network
modularity (Q) of wakefulness vs. N1, N2, and N3 sleep (*p<0.05). Results
are plotted against the network density δ (a function of the correlation
threshold, a free parameter for network construction). (B) Modularity, delta,
and alpha EEG power during arousals (transitions from sleep to wakefulness).
Two different EEG channels were used to extract EEG alpha and delta power:
occipital O1 (red) and central C3 (green). (C) Anatomical overlay of links
representing negative correlations between functional connectivity
fluctuations of the connected regions and spontaneous fluctuations of EEG
delta power (thresholded at p<0.05, Bonferroni corrected). Adapted from
Tagliazucchi et al. (2013). Figure reproduced with permission from Elsevier.
only be done by exhaustively evaluating the effective informa-
tion across all pairs of non-overlapping subsets. In practice, this
computation is impossible for the number of voxels recorded in
an fMRI experiment. Theoretically, 8 can take different values
for a same system when considered at different spatial and tem-
poral scales, and hence the scales at which the system optimally
integrates information need to be first identified (for a clear discus-
sion, see Tononi, 2010). fMRI records a metabolic signal correlated
with synaptic processing in gray matter regions of ≈1 mm3 with
temporal resolution in the range of 1 s. For computational rea-
sons, it is a common procedure to reduce the dimensionality using
anatomical information or clustering procedures (such as ICA). It
is certainly not clear whether this is the adequate spatio-temporal
scale. Also, dimensionality reduction can only be justified if units
are aggregated into a complex (Tononi, 2010), but this assumption
is difficult to justify without first identifying all complexes in the
system.
4. THE DYNAMICAL CORE HYPOTHESIS
Experimental observations strongly suggest that the thalamocor-
tical system is crucial for consciousness. Not only regions outside
this system are irrelevant in terms of conscious content, but also
localized thalamocortical lesions can be compatible with preserved
consciousness (Tononi and Edelman, 1998). Empirical evidence
further suggests that neural firing in a distributed subset of thal-
amocortical neurons occurs in response to any given conscious
percept. It has been suggested by Tononi and Edelman (Tononi
and Edelman, 1998; Edelman and Tononi, 2000) that such a group
of neurons must have the following properties: (1) It must be
a functional cluster, i.e., consist of neurons with stronger inter-
actions between them than with the rest of the thalamocortical
system (a concept analogous to that of the functional modules
introduced in the previous section), (2) This functional cluster
must be highly differentiated, i.e., must admit a large repertoire
of possible activity patterns. These two properties follow from the
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two main phenomenological features of consciousness discussed
in the previous section (its unified, undecomposable nature, and
its high informability).
At any given time, in order to contribute to conscious content
a neuron or group of neurons must participate in this thalamo-
cortical functional cluster, termed “dynamical core.” This name
emphasizes the changing nature of the functional cluster: its
configuration is postulated to constantly change (at a temporal
scale of hundreds of milliseconds) to accommodate the ongoing
stream of conscious perception and mentation. Therefore, it is
a categorical error to discuss where in the brain consciousness
takes place or which neurons are engaged in its generation, since
consciousness is a dynamical process which constantly reorga-
nizes and always comprises a highly differentiated thalamocortical
functional cluster.
On a different temporal scale, it has been recently discovered
that BOLD functional connectivity is dynamical and widely fluc-
tuates over time (Chang and Glover, 2010; Tagliazucchi et al.,
2011, 2012a; Handwerker et al., 2012; Hutchison et al., 2012;
Smith et al., 2012). These fluctuations occur in the range between
seconds and minutes, in contrast to the functional connectivity
changes in the hundreds of milliseconds which are involved in
the formation of the dynamical core. This different scale does
not eliminate the possibility that dynamical BOLD connectivity
is a manifestation of accumulated changes taking place in a faster
temporal range. Furthermore, we have recently shown that these
sudden BOLD functional connectivity changes can be traced to
fluctuations in frequency-specific local neural synchronization, as
indexed by scalp EEG power (Tagliazucchi et al., 2012b) (simi-
lar results were also independently obtained by another research
group; Chang et al., 2013) and that they are predicted by concep-
tual models of brain activity with realistic anatomical connectivity
(Haimovici et al., 2013). Insights on the dynamical nature of con-
scious processes could be then obtained by analyzing how BOLD
dynamical functional connectivity is modulated across different
conscious states. The dynamical core hypothesis predicts that,
while average connectivity can remain the same (or be even higher)
during sleep, its temporal variance will decrease when compared to
that of wakefulness. This result was confirmed for frontal connec-
tivity in subjects undergoing transitions to light sleep (Tagliazucchi
et al., 2012b), following the method outlined in Figure 3A. The
resulting variances are shown in Figure 3B for wakefulness, for
subjects undergoing transitions to light sleep and for the differ-
ence. It can be expected that capitalizing on new tools to map
dynamical changes of network modular structure (Bassett et al.,
2011), this line of research could also lead to the identification
of the most stable regions within different dynamical functional
clusters.
Of particular interest here is the relationship between BOLD
connectivity and EEG power in the relatively fast gamma (30–
60 Hz) band (Tagliazucchi et al., 2012b), since it has been demon-
strated that synchronization in this frequency range subserves
conscious perception (Melloni et al., 2007). Tellingly, correla-
tions between BOLD synchronization and gamma power were not
found for subjects undergoing transitions to early sleep. Further-
more, synchronization in the gamma range has been proposed as
a solution to the binding problem and could be of fundamental
importance for the formation of the dynamical core (Treisman,
1996). Taken together, these results show that large-scale dynam-
ical synchronization between a widespread network of brain
regions can be predicted from gamma power and can be mod-
ulated by vigilance fluctuations, putting in evidence the impor-
tance of dynamical functional connectivity for the maintenance
of wakeful rest.
5. CONSCIOUSNESS DURING NREM SLEEP
The previous discussions rely on the everyday experience of deep
sleep associated with a loss of conscious awareness. Dream reports
obtained after awakenings from REM sleep are full of vivid sen-
sory and emotional content (Hobson, 2002). In contrast, reports
obtained after NREM sleep stages are of a more heterogeneous
nature. Generally, the sleep stages defined by the AASM sleep stag-
ing criteria are associated with different behavioral and cognitive
changes, as well as with different types of subjective conscious
content reports obtained after sudden awakenings. Early sleep
(N1 stage) is characterized by recollections of vivid hypnagogic
hallucinations and lucid dreams (Domhoff, 2002; Kusse et al.,
2011), cognitive operations similar to those performed during
wakefulness (Stickgold et al., 2000; Wamsley et al., 2010) and in
some cases a failure to recognize a prior state of sleep (Tononi,
2009). It is known that the cortex can remain in a state similar to
wakefulness for minutes after the thalamic deactivation occurring
during sleep onset (Magnin et al., 2010), which could be behind
the conscious content present during early sleep. On the other
hand, subjects awakening from deeper (N2/N3) sleep stages often
do not report any conscious content prior to the awakening (Hob-
son,2002). This difference likely underlies preserved frontoparietal
connectivity during early sleep (Larson-Prior et al., 2009), as well
as a functional network modularity close to that of wakefulness
(Tagliazucchi et al., 2013).
In spite of a dramatically diminished conscious awareness,
dream reports are not completely absent from the deepest sleep
stages (Tononi, 2009). These reports are less lengthy than those
obtained after REM sleep and in general less vivid and elaborated
(Antrobus, 1983). However, this possibility makes it necessary
to monitor conscious content whenever sleep is used as a brain
state model for unconsciousness. Given the difficulty of awakening
every subject to ask them for reports of their conscious contents,
this fact is often overlooked in sleep neuroimaging studies which
aim to address changes associated with the unconscious state.
We asked our subjects to complete questionnaires after the
EEG-fMRI scanning session, which include numerical ratings of
conscious content of different nature, such as perceived visual
imagery and inner speech. We then performed a correlation
between these ratings and BOLD activity levels (relative to wake-
fulness) during N1, N2, and N3 sleep. A positive correlation with
inner speech ratings was found near the Heschl’s gyrus in the tem-
poral lobe and for visual imagery in the visual cortex (see Figure 4
for 3D renderings of the correlation maps). This result appears to
confirm that conscious sensory content can be present during a
sleep stage which is commonly associated with unconsciousness
(N2 sleep).
This and other results do not suggest by any means that NREM
sleep is an inadequate experimental model for unconsciousness.
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FIGURE 3 |The temporal evolution of BOLD synchronization is
correlated with the power of EEG oscillations in different frequency
bands. (A) Procedure followed to study the relationship between fMRI
functional connectivity changes and EEG power. A sliding window
procedure is applied to obtain the time-dependent Pearson correlation
between all pairs of BOLD signals extracted from any given brain
parcellation. The same sliding window is then applied to obtain the evolution
of EEG power in different frequency bands. (B)The temporal variance (σ 2) of
functional connectivity fluctuations between all pairs of regions. Results are
for awake subjects and for subjects undergoing transitions to light sleep
(drowsiness). On the right, the difference between both conditions is
plotted. (C) Pairs of regions showing a positive correlation between BOLD
functional connectivity and central EEG power in the gamma band
(30–60 Hz). Figure adapted from Tagliazucchi et al. (2012b).
FIGURE 4 | Rendering of brain regions with mean BOLD activity
(relative to wakefulness) during N2 sleep correlating with the reported
level of inner speech/visual imagery experienced during the fMRI
session (thresholded at z >3). Subjective reports were collected
retrospectively immediately after the fMRI session. fMRI data correspond
to the same subjects reported in Tagliazucchi et al. (2013).
Caution is in order, however, and there is a need for experimenters
to assess to what extent their subjects are truly unconscious.
6. CONCLUSION
In this review we have discussed the potential of NREM sleep neu-
roimaging to address fundamental predictions of theories about
human consciousness. A relatively recent but constant method-
ological progress has allowed researchers to extract information
from fMRI experiments going well beyond changes in BOLD sig-
nal amplitude. Many of these new methods are particularly useful
to test the aforementioned predictions. For example, functional
connectivity analyses reveal the disintegration of frontoparietal
connectivity during deep sleep. Global functional connectivity
networks studied using graph theoretical methods confirm that
the deepest stages of NREM sleep are associated with increased
functional modularity, in line with the predictions of the infor-
mation integration theory. The recent discovery of a constantly
changing BOLD connectivity could be fundamental to shed light
on how different states of consciousness modulate the occurrence
of transient synchronized states in the thalamocortical system.
We have emphasized that human consciousness is an emergent
and global property of the human brain. The distributed nature of
neural activity giving rise to consciousness is difficult to capture
with neuroimaging methods which do not provide simultaneous
coverage of the thalamocortical system with a reasonable spatial
resolution. Currently, fMRI is one of the very few methods at our
disposal which partially meets these requirements. However, the
excitement about its possibilities should not prevent a discussion
of its limitations. The most important is the limited temporal reso-
lution (in the range of seconds), especially considering that neural
processes giving rise to conscious awareness take place at the scale
of hundreds of milliseconds. This leads to a careful interpretation
of studies reporting functional connectivity changes, which need
to be interpreted as an average over long periods of time. The num-
ber of samples required to obtain reliable connectivity estimates
imposes a limit on the minimum temporal length during which
functional connectivity can be resolved, a limit which is effectively
longer than the actual temporal resolution of fMRI.
Finally, we closed our discussion with a note of caution regard-
ing human sleep as an empirical model of absent consciousness.
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While human NREM sleep offers many advantages, it is also ques-
tionable to what extent it can be considered completely devoid of
conscious content. Reports obtained after awakenings from early
sleep confirm the presence of vivid sensory imagery. On the other
hand, reports from deeper sleep stages are much shorter and can
in fact be lacking any conscious content at all. We approached
this problem by asking our subjects to fill a post-scan question-
naire which includes the rating of conscious sensory perception
(visual and auditory) during the experiment. Correlations with
BOLD activity were found in meaningful cortical regions dur-
ing N2 (but not N3) sleep. This result suggests that conscious
content can indeed be present during a typical NREM neuroimag-
ing experiment. Thus, researchers should take this possibility into
consideration when interpreting their results and, if possible,
probe conscious content during the different sleep stages under
study.
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